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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Gap Analysis is widely regarded as a useful tool to facilitate commercial and defense 
system acquisitions. This paper is a rethinking of the theoretical foundations and systematics of 
Gap Analysis with practical extensions to illustrate its utility and limitations. It also provides a 
new perspective on those theoretical foundations from the perspectives of systems and value 
engineering. 
The growing sophistication and complexity of new systems or system-of-systems have 
resulted in a dramatic increase in time and money to reach operational capability. Gap Analysis, 
properly defined and enacted, clarifies goals, appropriate investment and the end-use.  
Introduction    
The challenge of successfully acquiring and operating a new system is to ensure that the 
mission will be accomplished within an acceptable level of loss. To that end, there have been 
numerous attempts to develop and field systems that are intended to prevail in the event of 
conflict. How should these future systems be defined? Who is responsible? What processes 
guide the system requirements? If “we” perceive a deficiency or a desired goal that is different 
from that which we are intending, then there could exist a basis for gap in capability and, 
therefore, a desire to close the capability gap.  
What one desires versus what one has is, in essence, a Gap. The Gap is as much the 
relationship between what is perceived to be important and the derived difference between 
performance and expectations. The methodology and analysis of that difference is the 
descriptive foundation for Gap Analysis. From a mission-capability perspective, a Gap may 
consist of deficiencies in operational concepts, current or projected operational disadvantages, 
technologies, and understood future needs. To be specific, a Gap must be founded on the 
starting and ending points as well as the difference between these points. Quantifying these 
metrics typically involves evaluating a number of situations and mission scenarios in concert 
with actions or, more generally stated, guidance from policy and goals. Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) have long formed the set of standards from which to determine how well 
a capability satisfies a requirement (Sproles, 2002). MOEs are distinguishable from Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) in that MOEs offer the external view, while MOPs are more consistent 
with the internal view. The external view captures the system’s beginning and ending points, 
and the MOE of the candidate programs to fill the gap. The internal view involves measures of 
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how well one fills the gap through the MOPs. Therefore, one must formulate both MOEs and 
MOPs to fully define a Gap. However, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 
3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (2004, March 12) focuses on 
MOEs, yet does not mention MOPs. There is an implied admixture of MOEs and MOPs defined 
as MOEs, but the essential qualities of performance-based metrics are missing for carrying out 
activities and actions, for measuring functions, and from which to determine economic and 
numeric losses. 
Gap Analysis is deeply embedded and fully institutionalized as a cornerstone of the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition strategy, particularly in the critical 
process called Valuation of Alternative (VoA), formerly Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). It is the 
purpose of Gap Analysis within the DoD VoA process to report on the evaluation of the 
performance, operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs of the 
alternative systems to meet a desired mission capability. In this context, the VoA assesses the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternatives under consideration.  
The goal of Department of Defense (DoD) Gap Analysis is to compare current capability 
to a set of requirements. Where differences arise, gaps are identified and quantified, and 
mitigations are prioritized and planned. This paper addresses the theoretical foundations and 
systematics of Gap Analysis with extensions to illustrate its utility as a useful management tool 
for both defense and commercial acquisition purposes. Without a considered theoretical 
foundation from which to conduct Gap Analysis, an inadequate level of guidance regarding 
appropriate methodology and analytical methods may well result. The metrics of Gap Analysis 
are defined on the basis of system value (Langford, 2006; Langford & Huynh, 2007) and 
assessed risks. 
Discussion 
For the US Department of Defense (DoD), the acquisition of goods and services follows 
the policies outlined in Directives, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook DoD 5000 (the structure and operation of the 
defense acquisition system). In this context, Gap Analysis is a method for identifying the degree 
to which a current system satisfies a set of requirements. The goal of Gap Analysis is to align an 
anticipated future outcome with a future reality that can be formulated, definitized, and 
established or constructed. However, Gap Analysis is not intended to close the space between 
the most distant extremes or the rarest occurrences. Rather, Gap Analysis is centered on the 
larger, more general aspects that are by and large not part of the present reality (referred to as 
the current reference frame). For the DoD, Gap Analysis grew out of the realization that relying 
solely on a threat-based approach (used as a primary driver of requirements until 2000) or a 
technology approach to determining future needs is both costly and largely ineffective. One of 
the concerns with threat-based methods lies with the notion of being guided by the will and 
intentions of others (e.g., adversaries) (as exemplified through an analysis of threats, their 
efficacy and robustness), rather than relying on our competitive advantages to define and frame 
future engagements.  
Alternatively, a technology-centered approach is open-ended, with little constraint for 
what can be postulated. Acquisitions based on a technology approach may not result in a 
continuous presentation of appropriate military hardware that is consistent with lifecycle cost 
issues or the necessary capabilities in time of conflict. With only theoretical physics as the 
constraint, technology developments can extend twenty years or longer (e.g., ground-based, 
airborne, and space-based laser weapon systems). Even with an incremental approach to 
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delivering products, usable incarnations of systems may be distanced by inadequacies in the 
phases of development and levels of integration. At issue is the availability of weapons systems 
and doctrine that can prevail in hostilities without: (1) spending an enormous amount of money 
to sustain existing systems until new systems are delivered, and (2) having to develop a needed 
technology engineered and made available for use. Acquisitions based on a threat-based 
approach are always plagued by the credibility of the threat—the absolute measure of what an 
adversary will have available in the future.  
Accordingly, neither the technology nor the threat-based approaches address some of 
the persistent, perennial issues that fundamentally impact the implementations of Gap Analysis. 
Since the turn of the century, the DoD has concentrated on a capabilities-based 
approach, in which capabilities are defined and identified using a top-down approach infused 
with characteristics of measures of effectiveness, supportability, time, distance, effect (including 
scale) and obstacles to overcome. Capability is defined by an operational user as the ability to 
execute a specified course of action (CJCS, 2004). 
Gap Analysis Background 
The first reference to Gap Analysis was in the 1938 publication on the disjuncture 
between cultural goals and institutional norms (Merton, 1938). The notion was adapted to 
psychotic behavior (1950s), preferred biodiversity (1980s), personnel planning (1989), and more 
recently, competitive analysis and interest rates of financial instruments.  Gap Analysis was 
referred to in a series of instructions from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout 
the 1990s with reference to defining gaps in capabilities requiring a material solution. In the late 
1990s, the DoD infused a form of Gap Analysis into the acquisition process—comparing future 
threat-based assessments to current capability. Meanwhile, program costs seemed out of 
control; major projects were cancelled, and functionality was not being delivered as desired. A 
memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked for ideas to fix the DoD 
process of determining system requirements (Rumsfeld, 2001). Gap Analysis had come into 
being and was thriving within the structure of the JCIDS process. The determinant factor for 
acquisition had moved from a threat-based premise to a capabilities-based identification of 
needs. While the threat continues to be a part of the acquisition process, part of the initial 
capabilities document (ICD)—the document that initiates the acquisition system management 
process—Gap Analysis is performed on the basis of desired capability.   
While Gap Analysis should be neither technology-driven nor threat-driven, it is an 
approach that largely uses technology and threats as inputs to a vision-driven future. Gap 
Analysis is based on the high-level collective vision of what we need. This vision is discussed at 
the top levels of government within the context of the national security strategy: the strategic 
concepts postured for defense, the joint operations concepts, and the integrated architectures of 
US forces. The vision is then stated as a goal, one that is to be achieved methodically through a 
step-wise process. The problems with the existing formulation of Gap Analysis are determining: 
(1) what constitutes the foundation data, (2) which data are relevant to a future competitive 
analysis, (3) how should the relevant data be structured to deal with the future issues within the 
proper context, (4) what are the assumptions and scaling rules used to extend the current state 
of industrial output, technology advances, and engineering developments, and (5) what process 
or methodology enforces consistency of performing Gap Analysis. 
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The process of identifying needs and unsatisfied desires, or gaps in capability—in 
essence, the goal—is sometimes enacted through a set of ad-hoc processes and actions 
accompanied by an analysis of alternatives. Closing the capability gap between what exists and 
what is wanted includes the aptitude required to develop something new and the reference point 
from which one starts. This is an Omni-dimensional problem that encompasses strategy, 
operations, systems engineering processes, and the compositional elements of the system. 
Technology readiness and maturity are integral parts of Gap Analysis.  
The first step in improving Gap Analysis is to determine the underlying premises and 
fundamental metrics of such an Analysis. This paper investigates the theoretical issues of Gap 
Analysis and proposes seven metrics based on quantifiable worth, value, and risk. By 
developing the theory of Gap Analysis into a form that can be applied in a clear and consistent 
manner to the DoD acquisition process, we can directly apply the process of defining 
requirements. Specifically, Worth metrics can be applied to a critical examination of foundation 
data; Risk metrics can be used to interpret the relevancy of data; an Enterprise Framework 
(which displays Worth and Risk metrics) can illustrate context at a given time; and assumptions 
can be definitively scrutinized. To further understand and determine the applicability of Gap 
Analysis for DoD acquisition, a final step in this work is to identify the general limitations of Gap 
Analysis and the general impositions that Gap Analysis places on the success of the acquisition 
process. 
Theory 
Gaps have to do with mechanical causal histories—the telelogic argument that gaps 
exist and can be ameliorated by goal-directed actions. Aristotle was the first philosopher to 
formulate an accountable theory of telelogy founded on four causal properties: material, formal, 
efficient, and final. He argued that these four causes are required to give a complete account of 
any event. The cause of material involves being made of matter (e.g., the product); the cause of 
formal involves relations between entities (e.g., the network); the cause of efficient involves 
acting in certain ways (e.g., the procedures); and the cause of final involves having specific 
goals towards which actions are directed (e.g., the use) (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  
For the Department of Defense, Gaps are defined in terms of functional areas, relevant 
span and domain of military operations, intended effects, temporal matters, policy implications 
and constraints. Further, all gaps are defined in terms of capability. The Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development System (JCIDS—the formal US DoD procedure which defines 
acquisition requirements and develops the criteria to evaluate weapon systems) was 
implemented to specifically address capability gaps. But not all capability gaps require a 
material solution set. Changes or enactments of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) are also considered to close 
Gaps. Such considerations are formally evaluated before recommending the start of a new 
acquisition effort (CJCS, 2004; CJCS, 2005). In essence, functional capabilities are assessed to 
identify gaps.  
It is relevant to mention the pioneering work by Lawrence Miles (1972) to formally 
recognize and focus attention on functions of a product. Product functions create (or cause) 
performances relative to investment.  The ratio of performance to investment is a measure of 
relevancy and effectiveness. 
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Yet Gap Analysis is concerned with the difference between the present and the future, 
the reality and the expected, but not with the time or discrete time-steps between these 
disparities. While the DoD typically formulates its development interests in a temporal domain 
(e.g., a timeline of activities), the development activities are construed and managed as a 
discrete set of events. The Systems Engineering Process Models reinforce the notion of when 
to move from one stage of product development to the next stage, as well as what tasks need to 
be completed within each stage. Consequently, the notion of a temporal juxtaposition of 
activities is less relevant to the event-driven outcomes that characterize a future competitive 
space. In other words, Gap Analysis does not reflect when something will actually happen, only 
that it will happen. This defining of a Gap (in a different way than found in US acquisition policy, 
DoD 5000 series) lends itself naturally to a display of intentions that accurately reflect the 
constraints of event-based competition founded on the product, operations, and strategy of the 
various competitors.  
In total, this redacting of Gap Analysis into events rather than timelines eliminates the 
actual propositional attributes of the competition, but retains the notional attributes. 
Propositional attributes iterate the validity of belief attitudes (i.e., I know what I know; I know 
what I want). Notional attributes include intentions and wishes (i.e., the end result is not 
influenced by the proposer’s illative skills) (Duzi, 2002). Temporal considerations (e.g., I know 
when I want it) can be added as an attribute of the Enterprise Framework after the researcher 
gains an understanding of the situational awareness in event-space (a structure and analysis 
formed without temporal constraints). There are alternative interpretations of Enterprise 
Frameworks, most notably for software applications (Hafedh, Fayad, Brugali, Hamu & Dori, 
2002). This study maintains that such theories can be used to surmise a means to enforce 
consistency in process, application, and interpretation of Gaps. 
Value 
The prime distinguishing characteristic of Value Engineering is the use of functional (or 
function) analysis (Miles, 1972, first published 1961). Value Engineering (VE) was developed by 
Miles and Erlicher at General Electric in 1947 as a means recognize and explore what an 
element of the system does rather than what it is. Value Engineering is an organized process to 
optimize a system’s functionality versus cost. Alternatively, VE provides the necessary functions 
at the lowest cost, or determines which alternative design will provide the most reliable 
performance for a given cost. In essence, analyzing Value is the way and manner of analyzing 
productivity, selecting alternatives, and otherwise manipulating the ratio of Performance to Cost. 
For the purpose of this report, the authors will not distinguish between Value Engineering and 
Value Analysis. Value Analysis (VA) is typically concerned with productivity, the use of labor, 
materials and profitability.  
The term Value has many colloquial definitions, including the term’s use and misuse 
often disguised as promoting various marketing and sales concepts. But in the main, constructs 
of Value are without merit and meaning unless there is a relationship to functions, and therefore 
by reference, to system objective(s) or use(s). Value is not synonymous with cost or investment. 
Value is the functionality and performance of a system divided by the investment to deliver or 
sustain that system (Langford, 2006; 2007). Further, Value is not Worth, which is a measure of 
Value given risk (discussed in next section). There are different types of Value (use, esteem, 
cost, exchange, scrap, and so forth). For the purposes of this report, the authors do distinguish 
between the types of Value. 
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Value compares the functionality and use one receives versus what one invested 
(Langford, 2006). This notion of Value explicitly requires a buyer and seller model to determine 
Value. This presupposes that there is always a “source and a sink,” an “input and an output,” a 
pre-condition and a post-condition that is the determinant of Value. Therefore, Value is the ratio 
of the defining characteristics of the product (Functions and Performances) divided by the 
investment to achieve that functionality and performance. Value is measured in absolute terms. 
For example, the product shall provide a function with a specified performance. That function 
does 0.5 of what was paid for (as perceived from the point of view of the developer). Or 
perhaps, the performance was measured at 90% of the requirement. The investment expended 
to achieve that functionality and performance was as planned. Therefore, the value was less 
than desired (developer’s perspective). The Value Function (Equation 1) relates the System 
Value to the System Use(s) or to the System function(s) and performances related to the 
functions, divided by the investment. 
Equation 1.   
{ ( )* ( )}
( )
( )
F t P t
V t
I t
= ∑  
where )t(F is a function performed by the system; )t(P is the performance measure of the 
function )t(F ; )t(I  is the investment (e.g., dollars or other equivalent convenience of at-risk 
assets); and the time, t, is measured relative to the onset of initial investment in the project.  The 
unit of V(t) is that of )t(P divided by Investment (which could be quantified in terms of dollars 
or another meaningful measure an investment), since )t(F  is dimensionless. 
The importance of functions was underscored in 1954 by Lawrence Miles when he 
conceived Value Analysis (and the subsequent development of the fields of Value Engineering 
and Systems Engineering) away from the parochial focus of simply providing system 
components. He based his functional analysis on the component parts of the product, the 
totality of which provided the desired functions. The purpose of functional analysis was to 
establish why an element exists so that alternative solutions could be generated (Green, 1996). 
Value Engineering is the activity which identifies and analyzes the function of products and 
services to achieve an overall effectiveness in providing system functionality. Systems 
Engineering is the activity which identifies and analyzes functions of products and services to 
specify the requirements that need to be built and sustained.  
When applied to Gap Analysis, the metrics used for analyzing requirements are Value 
and Risk. Value is captured by the cost of Functions and their Performances, and Investment 
(measured in cost or investment). In common-sense fashion, Value is a measure of 
appreciation. It may be objective or subjective. Objective value relates to the idea that there is 
independence of assessments viewed from various perspectives—a consensus opinion of truth. 
Subjective value is based on what is expected (the sum of all corporal and abstract happenings 
from which you benefit and expect from a situation if you participate in a certain fashion). Value 
is simply the matter of minimizing cost or its time equivalency to develop a product. Value is the 
use that users expect (e.g., the functions and performance) for the investment they are willing to 
make. Further, Value is exemplified in the formulation of lifecycle costs and lifecycle time that 
express the transformation of company assets into profitably sold products that have a set of 
functions, performances, and quality. Each function is an activity that the product does with 
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certain performance attributes. For each function, there can be several performance 
requirements. But there is never a function without a performance (Miles, 1954; Langford, 2006; 
2007).  
Worth 
The notion of Worth extends the concept of value to include the intangibles of an 
indefinite quantity or other uncertainties. We define Worth as an indefinite quantification of 
something having a specified value. For example, “I have $20. Please give me $20 worth of 
gasoline.” I have already determined that gasoline has sufficient value to warrant my purchasing 
it, and I have a limited budget of $20. I am willing to purchase more gasoline at a later time, 
when I either have more than $20, have more time to pump the gasoline, or have a current 
additional constraint removed. But, is it worth it to purchase from this vendor or another vendor 
at another location? Perhaps $20 purchases more gasoline at a different location from a 
different vendor. The $20 will purchase either Quantity X from Vendor A or Quantity Y from 
Vendor B, where Quantity Y > Quantity X. The difference in distance between Vendor A and 
Vendor B is 5 miles, so I must drive an additional 5 miles to transact and receive more gas than 
I could receive from Vendor A. This presumes I know with a high degree of certainty that Vendor 
B offers the gasoline appropriate for my use and provides similar performance at a price 
sufficiently lower than I can get from Vendor A so as to warrant travel to Vendor B.  If my level of 
knowledge was lower about the price of Vendor B, then I must consider the worth issue in light 
of the uncertainty that Vendor B’s price would be sufficiently less than Vendor A’s price. In other 
words, is it worth the risk to drive farther and “shop” for gasoline? The loss may be quantifiable 
in the case in which Vendor B’s price is known. Either the price is sufficiently lower to justify 
driving to Vendor B’s location or it is not. If both the price and the distance are unknown, then 
there is less sufficiency and greater unknowns with which to deal. These unknowns can be 
incorporated into the Worth function as a determination of losses. If I do not locate a gasoline 
vendor before I “run out of gas,” I will incur additional costs of purchasing a gas can and the cost 
of my time converted on a cash basis. Further, if I locate a gasoline vendor whose price is 
higher than Vendor A, then I have paid more than I could have paid.  
By including the effects of high, sufficient, and low measures of quality, a decision based 
on Worth can be structured and evaluated in a methodical fashion. Obtaining sufficient 
information is typified by the trade-off between when one has paid too much or too little for 
either a given number of defects (1) as measured by a degradation or improvement in 
performance, or (2) which result in defects that are caused by certain levels of performance.  
Worth as simply the ratio of the Value V(t) multiplied by the Quality Q(t) (Langford, 2006; 
2007).  Performance indicates how well a function is executed by the system.  In this work, 
quality refers to the consistency of performance (or tolerance that signifies how good the 
performance is) in reference to the amount of pain or loss that results from the inconsistency as 
described by Taguchi (1990).  In essence, functions result in capabilities; performances 
differentiate competing products; and quality affects the lifecycle cost of the product.  For each 
function, there is at least one pair of requirements—performance and quality. The quality 
requirement indicates the variation and impact of the variation of the performance requirement 
of a function.  A system function may thus have different values of performance, and the quality 
of a performance may have different values.  The summation in Equation 1 is, thus, over all 
values of the functions, performance, and quality, for all time, and incorporating all uncertainties. 
Equation 2 indicates the Worth of system, as it references Value. 
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Equation 2.   
( )* ( )* ( )
( ) ( )* ( )
( )
F t P t Q t
W t V t Q t
I t
= = ∑  
where )t(Q is quality (the tolerance assigned to the performance measures), and the time, t, is 
measured relative to the onset of initial investment in the project.  We refer to the delineation of 
a function in terms of its performance and the quality of the performance as the triadic 
decomposition of the function.  If the unit of )t(Q  can be converted to the unit of )t(I (Equation 
1), then the unit of W(t) is that of )t(P , since )t(F  is dimensionless.  )t(Q  can be thought 
of as a loss that is incurred.  
Several schemes have been proposed to define and structure requirements, such as 
functions, performance, and tolerances/physical synthesis by Wymore (1993), hierarchical task 
analysis by Kruchten (2000), decomposition coordination method of multidisciplinary design 
optimization by Jianjiang, Zhong, Xiao, and Sun (2005), functional descriptions by Browning, 
Deyst, Eppinger and Whitney (2003) and Cantor (2003), and non-functional descriptions by 
Poort and Peter (2004).  The functional triadic decomposition proposed in this work forms a 
basis for a management tool that provides a structure to control the project.  Again, triadic 
decomposition prescribes that every function is imbued with the necessary and sufficient 
attributes of performance and quality.  It forms a basis for a management tool that provides a 
structure to control the project. 
Control centers on three functions (again, each with associated performance and 
quality): Regulate (monitor and adjust), govern (define limits, allocate resources, determine 
requirements, and report), and direct (lead, organize, and communicate).  
Traditional functional analysis, supplemented with the triadic decomposition, is 
conjectured to result in a complete and comprehensive set of requirements.  The resulting 
functional decomposition, together with commensurate system specifications and the 
mechanisms of action or activity (e.g., creation, destruction, modulation, translation, 
transduction), should form a basis upon which a system can be designed and built using the 
classical set of system development models—such as the spiral, “Vee,” and waterfall model. 
The Value of a product is thus quantified according to Equation 1, and the Worth of a 
product is quantified according to Equation 2.  From the manufacturer’s point-of-view, a 
“product’s worth” is one that has met some investment criteria for the desired set of functionality, 
performance, and quality requirements.  From the purchaser’s (consumer’s) point-of-view, the 
expression in Equation 2 aids in the trade between the applicability of a purchased product (in 
terms of the item’s functionality, performance, and quality) and the total cost and time invested 
in the purchase and use of the product (Langford, 2006; 2007).  
Value and Worth are calculated at the moment of the agreed exchange of 
product/services for a given amount or recompense.  Worth reflects the uncertainties based on 
losses that are associated with the exchange. These exchanges (or interactions between 
elements) are quantifiable and may have a net impact on the Value and Worth of the system, or 
in the exchange between two or more systems through their respective elements, a system(s)-
of-systems interaction.  We are interested in the interactions that have consequences that are 
measurable in the lifecycle of the product or service. To incorporate this level of minimum 
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interest, we introduce the concept of a Net Impact—defined as a consequence that exceeds a 
threshold that is determined to be of interest (Langford, 2006; 2007). 
Worth Transfer Function 
In control theory, a transfer function is a mathematical representation of the relation 
between the input and output of a system.  A Worth transfer function (WTF) between two 
elements of a system is defined to be the exchange of Worth between the two elements.  Worth 
is what is received (in terms of usefulness) for an investment.  This exchange necessarily 
assumes some measure of risk. Given risk, a WTF can thus be either a manifestation of the 
state (or a change in the state of a system), or a tool to evaluate differences between the state 
of a system and the state of another system, or between the states of two systems in a system-
of-systems.  In essence, the WTF represents various impact(s) on the state(s) of a system. The 
WTF can be a nested hierarchy of WTFs, all related through functional decomposition.  
Depending on the worth ascribed to each of the WTFs, the state(s) of the system(s) may be 
impacted to varying degrees.  The result is that a small number of WTFs may be equivalent to a 
large number of irreducible WTFs. 
A system is a set of elements that are either dependent or independent but interacting 
pairwise―temporally or physically―to achieve a purpose.  The elements form the boundary of 
the system.   This definition takes into account both the permanent and episodic interactions 
among elements of a system or systems of a system-of-systems.  It thus includes the lasting 
and occasional interactions, as well as emergent properties and behaviors, of a system.   These 
interactions effect transfer of energy, materiel, data, information, and services.  They can be 
cooperative or competitive in nature, and they can enhance or degrade the system Worth, which 
is defined below.  The pairwise interaction transfers a measure of Worth from one element of a 
pair to the other element.   We term the measure of the transferred worth the Worth Transfer 
Function (WTF). 
Complexity 
Complexity of a system is often characterized by the total quantity of units that make up 
the system.  As described by Homer and Selman (2001) and Li and Vitanyi (2006), it is both the 
number of and interactions among the units that, in general, are used to imply and define 
complexity.  The system complexity thus augments the management challenge because of the 
large number and various types of system elements and stakeholders.  In this work, complexity 
is reflected by the number and significance of WTFs among the elements of a system or among 
the systems of a system-of-systems.  Since an element of a system may also be a stakeholder 
of the system, an increase in the number of stakeholders increases the complexity. Managing 
complexity or managing stakeholders thus amounts to managing the WTFs.  It must be 
noted that a stakeholder with a large WTF (i.e., a funding source with many requirements) may 
add no more complexity than does a large number of stakeholders with a few requirements. 
Risk 
Using the logic in Lowrance (1976), Lewis (2006) defines simple risk as a function of 
three variables: threat, vulnerability, and damage.  By replacing damage with Worth, Langford 
and Huynh (2007) capture risk through threat, vulnerability, and Worth.  An element e  of a 
system is associated with a risk, eR , defined by  
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Equation 3.   (1 )e e e e e e eR X U W X a W= ∗ ∗ = ∗ − ∗   
where, * indicates the convolution that expresses the overlap and blending of factors; 
and where, threat, eX , is a set of harmful events that could impact the element; vulnerability, 
eU , is the probability that element e  is degraded or fails in some specific way if attacked; 
Worth,  [1 ]eeW V L= − , where Le is the loss that results from a successful attack on 
element e ; and susceptibility, ea , is the likelihood that an asset will survive an attack. eW  is 
given by Equation 2.  It may be a loss of productivity, casualties, loss of capital equipment, loss 
of time, or loss of dollars.  Susceptibility is the complement of vulnerability. Equation 3 reflects 
these tentative affinities. One finds vulnerabilities in a worthy system from the threats to that 
system. 
Since an element in a system (or network) may be connected to more than one element, 
the number of WTFs associated with the element is the degree of the element.  Subscribing to 
Almannai and Lewis (2007), we obtain the system risk, R , as 




i i i i
i
R X a gW
+
=
= ∗ − ∗∑  
in which  n  denotes the number of elements; m  denotes the number of links or WTFs, and 
ig denotes the degree of connectedness (i.e., the number of connections) to the thi  element.   
As a result of the WTF between two elements, 1e  and 2e , at the moment of their 
interaction, we have 








It is the expression in Equation 4 that forms the basis for complexity management and 
acquisition. 
Discussion 
The approach extends the published and private works of Langford to identify and apply 
measurable objectives to characterizing and analyzing Gap Analysis. The two basic metrics are 
competitive Worth and a Cost-to-risk ratio. Both are displayable in an Enterprise Framework.  
Gap Analysis fits into the overall scheme of acquisition by providing decision-makers 
with a structured and objective VoA from which to procure systems that satisfy defined needs. 
The desired results of Gap Analysis are to: (1) predict what we need for a postulated event, (2) 
compare what we need to what we have, (3) identify those items that need to be changed or 
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added—along with the amount of investment in time and money required, and (4) enumerate 
the potential limitation of future capabilities. Recognizing there may be no means to maintain an 
optimal relation between the two limits—what we need and a potential limitation in capabilities—
we assume the principles and practices of engineering are evolutionary and that the 
fundamental laws of physics prevail.  
Further, we use generally accepted economics terminology, extended to encompass the 
notion that the price one pays for a product assumes and accounts for the loss realized to make 
the purchase (Taguchi, Chowdhury & Wu, 2005). That is, the purchase price of a product 
includes the cost of procurement—for example, the $1 purchase of a pen must be increased to 
$5 to include $0.50 of gasoline, plus amortized cost of maintenance, plus insurance, plus 
depreciation, and plus labor rate times travel time to drive to/from and make the purchase, etc. 
This notion states a willingness to spend (lose) $x to purchase a $1 item. 
Following the accepted systems engineering process, product requirements are defined 
hierarchically, with each successive level offering greater detail via decomposition. However, 
unlike the different types of requirements that attach to various process models (e.g., functional 
and non-functional requirements), we define all processes and products by three measures—
their functions, performances, and qualities (Langford, 2006; 2007). Relative to the Investment 
(Cost or its equivalent) to bring a product to operational capability, the product has determinable 
Worth. That Worth is expressed as a ratio of total value (i.e., operational capability or use as 
measured in terms of a unit of performance (e.g., work, throughput…) multiplied by Quality 
(effectively divided by the potential losses that could be incurred) and then divided by total 
lifecycle investment (i.e., expected cost for the use). As an example, if this ratio is less than 1, 
then the product has lower-than-expected worth. 
Worth is related to both the vulnerabilities of the system and to the outputs of the 
system. The risks are a function of the threats and vulnerabilities, where threats are typed by 
magnitudes and frequencies, and vulnerabilities are determined by the likelihoods of success 
(DoD, 2006). The outputs of the system are related to the vulnerabilities through the price-
demand elasticity curves (Lemarechal, 2001).  The competition and the marketplace determine 
the threats; the operational strategy determines the vulnerabilities; and the triad of requirements 
determines the Worth (Langford, 2007). 
To investigate the multivariate probability-density functions of the Risk Equation 
(Equation 3), a step-wise, two-variable analysis reveals both the boundary conditions and the 
relationships between Worth, Vulnerability, Threat, and Risk. Table 1 shows these boundary 
conditions. When any of the three variables (Worth, Vulnerability, or Threat) is zero, Risk is 
zero. And conversely, when Risk is zero, one or more of the three variables (Worth, 
Vulnerability, or Threat) is zero. 
Table 1. Multivariate Boundary Conditions for Risk Equation 
Worth = 0 Risk = 0 
Worth = 0 Threat = ∞  
Vulnerability = 0 Risk = 0 
Threat = 0 Risk = 0 
Risk = 0  Threat = 0 
Risk = 0  Vulnerability = 0
Risk = 0  Worth = 0 
 =
=




A product that has Worth (quantified by the Worth Equation, Equation 2) from the 
developer’s point-of-view is one that has met the investment criteria for the desired set of 
functionality, performance, and quality requirements. From the user’s point-of-view, the Worth 
Function Equation emphasizes the trade that is made between the applicability of the purchased 
item (in terms of the item’s functionality, performance, and quality) and the total cost and time 
invested to purchase, use and sustain the product. This total cost and time (accumulated over 
the product’s lifecycle) is incurred not only during acquisition of the product, but also during the 
operation of the product and, finally, its disposal. This lifetime cost and time investment can also 
be viewed as a total loss to society (Taguichi, 1990), or as a specified loss as defined by a set 
of conditions. 
Within the constraints of the boundary conditions indicated in Table 1, the relative ratios 
of Worth/Risk for an activity, a process, or a product or service may be displayed as probability 
density functions, and then summarized for display purposes as single data points. Figure 1 
indicates two product lines—each drawn with designated points on curves depicting desirability, 
acceptability, and unacceptability. Product A (indicated on the upper right) has a higher market 
worth-to-risk ratio than Product B (lower left).  The increasing worth-to-risk ratio moves generally 
upward.  Product A can be compared to Product B on a one-to-one basis. Product parameters 
that indicate movement vertically upward reflect a decreasing threat but no change in 
vulnerability. Products that indicate movement horizontally to the left reflect decreasing 
vulnerability but no change in threat. Products that compete on price, such as the lower-priced 
Product B in Figure 1, have Event-space Strings (Langford, 2007) that are displaced upwards 
relative to their higher-priced competitors. Event-Space Strings are made up of sequences of 
causal events. These events are separated by probabilistic transitions rather than by either 
temporal or spatial (in the sense of being an adjacent event in a series) idealizations.  
Consequently, Product B has a ”Desired” position, which is higher than that of Product 
A’s “Acceptable” position in the competitive Enterprise Framework. The higher position is 
indicative of the lower price (the lifetime cost to the consumer). If the lower price was offset by 
reduced functionality, performance, or quality, then the Worth would not increase. Product B is 
also located to the left of Product A, which indicates a reduction in vulnerability. This implies 
reduced risk and reduced threats. Therefore, as a competitive strategy, offering the lowest price 








Figure 1. Enterprise Framework Illustrating the Worth-to-risk Assessment  
for Competing Products 
The metrics for evaluating the Value-to-risk ratio or the Worth-to-risk ratio and their 
associated examples that describe contextual relationships are indicated in Table 2. These 
metrics are the rules which govern movement in the Enterprise Framework. Each rule 
corresponds to the impacts of business operations, competitive strategy, and the means or type 
of product offering. Event-space Strings are unique to a company’s operations, strategy, and 
product offering. These rules describe the order of relative motions that have meaning 
appropriate to the context of a competitive space. Further, these rules are applicable to 
commercial products and services, the DoD battlespace, the procurement and acquisition 
landscapes, and the business environment considerations of business models and strategies.  
In general, the Enterprise Framework is a visualization of decision-making processes in 
which the factors of value engineering, systems engineering, economics, acquisition, and 
operations research are involved. From such rules, the DoD Gap Analysis progresses in an 
orderly and logical fashion. Traditional statistical analysis, probability theory, and modeling are 
readily represented in proper context with conventional interpretation. As such, an error analysis 
results in confidence intervals for each point on the Event-space Strings. The scales of threat-1 
and vulnerability-1 are determined by the probability of occurrence (0 to 1) multiplied by the 
frequency of occurrence (rate), and the odds of successfully inflicting loss (0 to 1), respectively.  
The vulnerability scale can be normalized in terms of dollars or numbers of items. Threats can 
be similarly normalized, as the situation warrants. Worth can be stated in either dollars or by 
numbers of items. Risk is a number between zero and one.  
Of the possible rules (Table 2) for interpreting the Enterprise Framework, 31 have been 
identified; and thus far, 17 have been investigated. For example, Rule 1 implies a higher product 
utility (higher functionality, performance, and/or quality).  
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Table 2. Rules for Risk Equation in Enterprise Framework 
Vulnerability  Worth Risk Threat Rule   1 
Vulnerability  Threat      Risk  Worth  Rule   2 
Vulnerability  Risk  Threat  Worth  Rule   3 
Vulnerability Risk Threat Vulnerability Rule   4 
Vulnerability   Threat Value Risk Rule   5 
Vulnerability Worth Risk Threat Rule   6 
Threat Risk  Vul.  Worth  Rule   7 
Threat Risk  Unless vulnerability and/or worth    Rule   8 
Threat Risk           or Worth  Rule   8 
Threat Risk  Worth     and vulnerability   Rule   9 
Threat Risk  Unless vulnerability and/or Worth   Rule 10 
Value  Threat      Risk Vulnerability Rule 11 
Value  Vul.  Risk Threat Rule 12 
Value  Risk  Threat  Vulnerability Rule 13 
Value  Threat Risk Vulnerability Rule 14 
Value  Risk  Risk Vulnerability Rule 15 
Value  Vul.  Risk Threat Rule 16 
Vulnerability  Threat Worth  Risk Rule 17 
 
For a decrease in vulnerability (e.g., opening a new channel of distribution) due to a new 
competitive entrant in the marketplace (increase in threat), Rule 2 requires an increase in Worth 
commensurate with an increase in the Risk the enterprise is willing to accept. If the competitive 
landscape does not change and the enterprise’s product remains the same, then opening up a 
new channel of distribution both decreases the product’s vulnerability to competitive factors as 
well as reduces the enterprise risk with that product. Rule 4 indicates that an increase in 
vulnerability results in an equivalent increase in risk—if there are no changes in threat, and the 
product remains the same. Rule 5 indicates that a decrease in threat directly results in a 
decrease in risk if the enterprise’s product and vulnerability are unchanged. Rule 6 implies that 
an increase in vulnerability decreases Worth (e.g., cost paid by a consumer increases due to a 
reduction in channel distribution) and increases the enterprise’s risk if the threat landscape 
remains constant. Rule 7 indicates a reduction in the threat (e.g., competitors leave competitive 
space) results in commensurate reduction in risk, and the Worth and vulnerability stay the 
same. Rule 8 indicates a reduction in the threat (e.g., competitors leave competitive space) 
results in commensurate reduction in risk, unless either the product value or vulnerability 
increase—in which case, the overall risk would increase. Rule 9 indicates that as the threat 
increases, the risk increases, assuming the Worth and vulnerability remain constant. Rule 10 
indicates that as the threat increases, the risk increases, unless either or both the value and 
vulnerability decrease. Rule 11 implies a greater investment in time and, therefore, a lower 
value and, hence, a higher risk. Rules 6, 12, and 16 each imply a lower product utility 
(insufficient functionality, performance, and/or quality). Rule 13 implies the product utility is 
worthless. Rule 14 implies a lower investment (time x money) and, therefore, a higher product 
Worth. Rule 15 implies the product has both higher utility and higher risk and is, therefore, worth 
more given that the threat and vulnerability remains unchanged. Rule 17 implies a disruptive 
technology or discontinuous innovation (Langford & Lim, 2007). 
Following-up on this last rule that drives the display and interpretation of data in the 
Enterprise Framework, the discovery and analysis of potentially disruptive events and 
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technologies (Rule 17) poses particularly incongruent issues for Gap Analysis. At issue is the 
degree of uncertainty that influences the choices and selection of alternatives in acquisition. The 
dangers of underestimating or not recognizing a disruptive technology or disruptive innovation 
result in a miscalculation of: (1) a sound operational vision, (2) the importance of planning and 
implementing an appropriate operational model, (3) the understanding of the relationships 
between current paradigms and a disruptive technology or innovation, and (4) the requisite 
acquisition strategy. 
Finally, the graphical display of the competitive space (Enterprise Framework) found in 
Figure 1 portrays the results of Gap Analysis. From the view of the Enterprise Framework, the 
gaps reveal the needed capabilities, the prioritization of the capabilities, and the efficacy of the 
proposed alternatives. In the case of weapon systems, the Enterprise Framework is the 
geographical battlespace. It has physical structure, command structure, information structure, 
and engagement structure. Each structure is depicted in temporal- and event-driven layers. 
Truth is established through scenarios that illustrate capabilities that are enacted through these 
structures. Additionally, the Enterprise Framework illustrates opportunity shifts, allows 
evaluation of potential adversaries, and guides decision-makers’ choices of what should be 
developed, indicates the system requirements that are satisfied by various strategies, illustrates 
potential target segmentations, and describes geographical arenas in the context of system 
capabilities. 
General Formulation of Results 
This work defines an Enterprise Framework in which to display the results of a Gap 
Analysis. For the purposes of this paper, an Enterprise Framework is a marriage of business 
parameters (reflecting operations and strategy) and product parameters (functions, 
performance, and qualities). The marriage is bonded through the structure of an expression of 
Risk (Equation 2).  
In essence, the Enterprise Framework is an application framework that includes a 
multivariant view of a competitor’s objectives, structure, and behavior. It is an adaptation of 
human activities into an abstraction that models the differences between these objectives, 
structures, and behaviors. Further, the framework is constrained by only two factors: 
geographical boundaries (for contextual structure) and a common event (to bring specificity to 
the nature of the competition).  
Unlike the products of the domain analysis process, which processes imply a reference 
model for the semantics of the application domain, the Enterprise Framework described in this 
paper does not distinguish between such reference models, reference architectures, and the 
results of mapping a reference model (domain model) into an architecture style. Further, our 
Enterprise Framework is also not an analysis-only enterprise framework (Hafedh et al., 2002). It 
generally investigates the interfaces between a subject or action (e.g., issues, process or 
activity and other issues, processes or activities) and other subjects or actions.  
However, in the case of Gap Analysis, our Framework has provided additional insight 
into its nature to examine its territory—the makeup of and changes in its surrounds, environs, 
relationships, and key drivers. There are different types of Gap Analysis “domains.” Sometimes 
these domains are constrained by organizational demands, sometimes by personality issues, 
and sometimes by other circumstances. The internal structure of the Gap Analysis domains are 
arranged in particular patterns within an organization.  Continuous functions (or patterns) are 
built and sustained by authoritative proclamation. Over time, such structures evolve to a mature 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 25 - 
=
=
environment that supports decision fitness and reliability in process planning. However, when 
the Gap Analysis territory is invoked, organized, structured, and enacted in response to stimuli, 
the outcomes of the work are predictably inconsistent and generally low in efficacy (Langford et 
al., 2006, December).  
Additional questions arise when we formulate an overall strategy to analyze Gap 
Analysis: Do all organizations have Gap Analysis policies, strategy, procedures, processes, and 
rules? Are the enactments the same? How does Gap Analysis differ within and across 
organizations? What are the priority and process necessities that are observed? How and why 
does the position of Gap Analysis within an organization matter? Do the organization’s position 
and priorities affect how Gap Analysis is performed, how it is interpreted, why it is done, how it 
is done, who does it, what is done, or when it is done? Are there general (or simple) rules that 
apply to all Gap Analyses?  
These questions focus on the crux of the rules, roles (responsibilities), and mechanisms 
that determine how Gap Analysis is organized, and how host organizations change during the 
Gap Analysis process. It is one of the purposes of this research to move beyond the descriptive 
and correlative aspects of investigating Gap Analysis. While such an early mapping activity 
provides decision-makers the necessary framework to begin to understand and to identify areas 
for additional investigation, it must also identify the mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of 
Gap Analysis, and then determine how these mechanisms respond and contribute to the 
psychological cues, such as stimulation through signaling pathways. 
The Enterprise Framework is a tool—a means to comprehend competitive business and 
operational models and product offerings, structured in forms that compare and definitively rate 
each. Additionally, market segmentations, niches, products, and upgrade strategies are readily 
apparent when coupled with a backward-looking series of event-space framings. An example of 
a generic Enterprise Framework is shown in Figure 1.  
In the Framework, threat to the competitive offering is plotted versus its vulnerability. 
Risk is held constant, and Worth (Function, Performance, Quality divided by Investment) 
increases to the upper right. If a product is upgraded, the data point moves along the curve from 
the left to the right. The range of acceptability is indicated as Unacceptable (on the left) to 
Desirable (on the right). A Gap represents the space between data points. Moving from one 
curve to the next also indicates a Gap, but not an upgrade of an existing product. Rather, this 
Gap represents a form of Disruptive Technology in the competitive landscape. An increase in 
Worth is indicated as the points move “up” the curves to the top and to the left. A decrease in 
Worth is indicated as the points move “down” the curves to the bottom and to the right. The 
rules indicated in Table 2 illustrate the meanings and visualizations of Gaps. The scales of 
Threat-1 and Vulnerability-1 are relative scales for local normalization of the competitive 
parameters. In a more global summarization of Worth across multiple competitive domains, 
there are other issues, such as localized determination of value versus universal principles of 
value. For example, is it more valuable to go to a restaurant or to invest in a set of cooking 
utensils? Is it worth more to make such an investment? Some of the factors that need to be 
considered are the opportunities from “networking” at the restaurant versus the long-term 
investment in lowering the cost of eating. For the purpose of this paper, the authors relate only 
the localized competitive factors when comparing products. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Gap Analysis is fundamental to the US DoD acquisition system. The dismal results of 
time and cost overruns, ineffective use of constrained resources, and missed opportunities to 
make improvements without jeopardizing schedule and cost drive a critical evaluation of DoD 
acquisition (Rumsfeld, 2001). Since the cost and the success of acquisition are constrained by 
initial conditions, it is prudent to develop and apply tools that can help improve both the 
evaluation and the processes of acquisition. Gap Analysis, one of the key early-phase drivers of 
the acquisition process, has significant room for improvement.  
This paper discusses the Systems Engineering Value Equation (Value Engineering) and 
the Worth Function in the context of the ratio of triadic decomposition of requirements based on 
functions, performance, and quality to the investment in time and cost. Investors and 
stakeholders have expectations about products they support. These expectations necessarily 
need to be met with a rigorous analysis of gaps. This notion has general adaptability and 
applicability to commercial and DoD acquisition. In the commercial sense, Gap Analysis tools 
can be used to better position products in the competitive market space. In the DoD sense, Gap 
Analysis tools provide a more effective use of constrained resources to support development 
activities.   
The application of Gap Analysis to the general problem of satisfying requirements 
involves more than simply improving the methodology. Methodology that is encumbered with 
time-consuming steps and overburdened processes does not improve Gap Analysis. It is only 
through a streamlining of Gap Analysis that is efficacious, effective, and efficient that the forces 
and consequences of acquisition are better served. Thus, it is much more important and to the 
point to determine how to improve the outcomes of Gap Analysis (including the time to complete 
the Gap Analysis process) than to determine merely what can be improved with Gap Analysis. 
To that end, the actions of Gap Analysis should not be obstructed by insistence on unnecessary 
procedures and folderol. Straightforward application of the formulations laid out in this report 
result in the application of the sound value engineering and systems engineering processes that 
have generally become widely accepted as standard practices.  
At least some future research on Gap Analysis should concentrate on the further 
expansion of the standards of earned value management as well as on the integration of new 
management practices to exploit fully the prowess of value engineering and systems 
engineering. 
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